UDA for Dummies

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UDA for Dummies

Post by burningmouth » Sun Jan 27, 2013 3:12 am

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Hi, my name is burningmouth; and I am a dummy composed of green integers.

I have finally re-read UDA 0, and I am ready to begin with UDA 1. I think I'm familiar with the difference between Plato and Aristotle as for as this discussion goes. I now have a beginner's understanding of the term digital mechanism (comp).

Firstly, I have a question for SL24 relating to something he said in an earlier post:
Quantum mechanics without collapse (Everett 'Many Worlds') confirms the digital mechanist 'many dreams' interpretation of arithmetic.
My questions are:
Why does digital mechanism work "without collapse" and not 'with collapse'? In other words, what is the significance of "without collapse"?

How do universal numbers relate to "many dreams"?

Thanks, SL
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Re: UDA for Dummies

Post by burningmouth » Sun Jan 27, 2013 3:42 am

Image
Technically, the above gif doesn't exactly show a cut and paste (or a copy and paste). I guess the square should become a square, and the circle should become a circle. Oh, well.

UDA 1

salvialover24 wrote:A Universal Dovetailer (UD) is a program which generates all programs, and executes all programs. Given that there is an infinity of programs, and that many of them will never stop, the UD is obliged to run them little pieces by little pieces. Obviously, such a UD running never stops itself. You can also guess that it generates a sort of fractal, given that it will generate its own running infinitely often. You can guess it generates a highly redundant computations. The Mandelbrot set lover can compare the UD with it.

salvialover24 wrote:UDA step 1

- Would you accept that your daughter marries Jack?

- What's the problem with Jack?

- Jack just accepted a job, ... on the planet Mars.

- Ah! Gosh. My daughter will not see her husband very often in that case. It takes already about two years to just go there!

- Not really. Jack uses digital teleportation.

- Which means?

It means he get "cut", that is: scanned and read at some level of resolution, and then annihilated. The read information is sent on Mars by radio waves, which takes four minutes (+ 10 for the reconstitution). On mars, his body is paste, that is: reconstituted at the (supposedly correct) level of resolution, from the description which arrived from earth, using the local materials (atoms) already on Mars.
He makes its job on Mars, and then he go through the same process again to return on Earth.
He cut and paste himself two times per day by going on Mars and coming back. He does not complain, he loves his job there.

The question is really "Are you OK that this is made in principle possible when we assume the hypothesis of digital mechanism?"

If you have heard about quantum teleportation, don't confuse it with digital teleportation.
Digital teleportation, or digital teletransportation is really a cut and paste, if you look at yourself as a sort of "words" written in the language of chemistry.

"With the old technic of the third millennium, you needed to be frozen, and the scanning took days, and the reconstitution took weeks, but now, in the end of the fourth millennium, those things take no time. " - They said, in the legend, say. A ticket London-Earth to Paris-Texas-Mars was quite affordable.

No conceptual problem?
I guess I have no conceptual problem. It's nice to already have a cheat sheet (the UDA 1 thread). After reading the replies, I guess most people are on board that there's no conceptual problem.

SL24 wrote:
Note that Digital Mechanism assumes just that there is a level of resolution where you survive the brain substitution.
Well, if Jack survives on the assumption of Digital Mechanism, then there shouldn't be a problem.
He cut and paste himself two times per day by going on Mars and coming back. He does not complain, he loves his job there.
If Jack doesn't complain, and his close friends don't notice anything, then everything should be copasetic.
If you have heard about quantum teleportation, don't confuse it with digital teleportation.
Digital teleportation, or digital teletransportation is really a cut and paste, if you look at yourself as a sort of "words" written in the language of chemistry.
SL, why do you set apart quantum teleportation and digital teleportation? What's the difference?
In 1993 an international group of six scientists, including IBM Fellow Charles H. Bennett, confirmed the intuitions of the majority of science fiction writers by showing that perfect teleportation is indeed possible in principle, but only if the original is destroyed.
---wikipedia

I wonder why the original has to be destroyed?

#########################################
#########################################

UDA 2
salvialover24 wrote:Jack is currently working alone in a secure place on Mars such that the landscape does not change on large period of many years.

On a special day, Jack is cut and annihilated, but the paste process get buggy, and the reconstitution is made with one year of delay (but without any further changes).

Do you agree that:
the third person discourse will be quite different than usual. It will be like "Shit, my husband is again stuck in nowhere, I will have to wait one year, ..."
That the first discourse (by jack) will be the same, like : " I go on Mars, I arrive on Mars, everything is fine, let's do the job, ...".

Could Jack, (always assuming mechanism) be aware of the delay of reconstitution, without any clue (like could be trees, for example) in that desert landscape.

More generally, could a first person be aware of any delay of reconstitution, without external clues.

I allow abuse of language like saying "a first person is aware of something" for "the first person's diary contains that something"(*).

OK?
-----SL24

Yep. OK.

Here's a stupid question:

Let's say Jack is pasted a year later. During that time the solar system has moved a long distance through space. Does Jack's different place in the cosmos have any effect on the infinite numerical associations going on in Jack's brain?
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Re: UDA for Dummies

Post by burningmouth » Sun Jan 27, 2013 7:46 am

UDA 3
salvialover24 wrote:Step 3 involves a duplication of a person, like Mister D. Except here, the candidate knows the protocol in advance.
So mister X lives in Amsterdam, and he accepts to be cut and pasted in two places at once, Washington and Moscow (say).

The question is: can mister X predict, in Amsterdam, before the experience is done, what he will write in his first person diary after the duplication is completed?

Of course mister X can say something like, '--you can join me later in Washington AND in Moscow!', in some third person way.
But what can he think about where he will feel to be?

The third person discourse is simple. Jack is in Amsterdam before, and he is in Washington AND in Moscow after. But what will be the first person discourse(s)?

Jack cannot say: I am sure that I will feel to be in Moscow, for this will be infirmed by the one in Washington, and vice versa.

What will both W-Jack and M-Jack learn?

Do you agree that Jack is uncertain, just before the duplication, about its immediate first person (personal) future after?

Is it reasonable to quantify that uncertainty with probabilities? Like there is 1/2 chance to find oneself in W, and 1/2 to find myself in M?
Well, I read the replies in the official UDA 3 thread. They were all very interesting.
Poor X-Jack. W- Jack and M- Jack are going to run through X's bank account twice as fast as before.

This is a tough one. Doesn't W- Jack feel with a 100 percent 1st person certainty that X- Jack was pasted in W (after the fact); and doesn't M- Jack feel with a 100 percent 1st person certainty that X- Jack was pasted in M (after the fact)?

If the question only concerns X- Jack's 1st person pondering of where he will be after the pasting, then there seems to be a logical hiccup happening here. Something ain't computing.
Like there is 1/2 chance to find oneself in W, and 1/2 to find myself in M?
Maybe I'm just a dummy, but there seems to be a 100 percent, 1st person chance that X- Jack will end up in W, and a 100 percent, 1st person chance that X- jack will end up in M.

But I'm willing to go along with the others concerning the 50/50 scenario.
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Re: UDA for Dummies

Post by salvialover24 » Mon Jan 28, 2013 11:43 am

Hi Dummy Boy :)

You ask many questions (good). The first one is probably the more complex to answer, as it needs a bit of quantum mechanics, which is not needed for the UDA, but can be used to illustrate some of the, probably startling or disturbing (for some), consequences of Digital Mechanism (computationalism, comp, etc.). The second one is not so easy too, and probably needs a big part of ... the UDA.
My problem is that I have no idea of what you know about quantum mechanics. So we can work by approximation: I answer, and you ask further in case you are not satisfied.

To be sure, we don't need any answer to those two first question to proceed in the UDA, and so, if I answer them, it is more for the fun, and to ease your impatience. We might at some point create a "quantum mechanics thread" to dig deeper on that issue.

I see also you have edited four times the first post, I hope you will not edited it before this reply ... :)

Your first question is
Why does digital mechanism work "without collapse" and not 'with collapse'? In other words, what is the significance of "without collapse"?
Answer: in quantum mechanics we can add "classical physical states" and get a new physical state. The best known example is Schroedinger's cat. We can (and later I might explain how) put a cat in the state "DEAD + ALIVE". Here DEAD and ALIVE are the two classical states, and QM says that we can manage the cat to be in a state DEAD + ALIVE. By doing so we can predict correctly many results that we can obtain about possible observations made for the cat. In particular, if we decide to just observe if the cat is DEAD or ALIVE, we will see it DEAD or ALIVE with a probability equal to 1/2.
You might then think that the state DEAD + ALIVE is just in reality a classical state like "DEAD or ALIVE". The cat would be either dead or alive when in the state DEAD+ALIVE. Later I can explain why this will not work (we can do other observations on the cat which would contradict this). Yet, looking just to the state ALIVE/DEAD, we do find the cat either alive or dead.
Today, there is no unanimity among physicists, about what means DEAD+ALIVE, and what happen when we look at the cat. But there are two main very different answers. I will call them COPENHAGEN and EVERETT. "Copenhagen" is the standard answer, very often exposed in the textbook. It says that when we look at the cat in the state DEAD+ALIVE, the observation destroys the state "DEAD + ALIVE" into either the state DEAD, or the state ALIVE, with the probability 1/2. This works fine in practice, as indeed subsequent observation will not lead to contradictions. But there is a big problem: the wave equation, which is the core of Quantum Mechanics, does not allow this to happen. This means that the observation cannot itself be described by the wave equation, and somehow it leads to the idea that QM describes differently the observed and the observers.

The vocabulary is that the wave "DEAD+ALIVE" collapses into DEAD, or collapses into ALIVE, with the relevant probability.

This has led to many different explanation why it could be like that: from: - 'the macroscopic device does not obey to the wave', to - 'consciousness does not obey to the wave'.

But such kind of explanations by "collapse" have many drawbacks, and "COPENHAGEN" appears to be like a rule of thumb that nobody understands. It cannot be used in field theory, quantum cosmology (where the wave is applied to entire galaxies or black hole), quantum computing, etc.

In 1957, Everett proposed a much simpler explanation. It consists very simply to apply QM, purposefully to, not just the cat, but to the entire system of the observer looking at the cat. In that case the wave equation describes the following. If *YOU* look at the cat, in the state DEAD+ALIVE, the wave describes:

YOU * (DEAD + ALIVE) = YOU*DEAD + YOU*ALIVE.

With YOU*DEAD = YOU in front of a dead cat, and YOU*ALIVE = you in front of the alive cat.

The superposition (as the "+" is called, here) of the cat state becomes contagious to its environment, including the observer. This leads to a ... "parallel reality". It explains why "YOU" found the cat in either a dead, or an alive state, despite the superposition has not disappear (as the wave describes).

Now you can see the relation with COMP. Looking at a superposition state (like DEAD+ALIVE), duplicates yourself in two examplars "You seeing the cat alive" + you seeing the cat dead". Everett makes the QM probabilities, similar to the probabilities we can find with "usual" (non quantum) duplication of a person.
I hope this can help a little bit.

Your second question:
How do universal numbers relate to "many dreams"?
There is one thing, already explained a bit to kedabra in his thread, which will be tough to explain to you; not because you are a dummy, but because it asks for some work. A part of that work is needed for UDA step 7, and a bigger amount is needed for step 8 (but the whole thing is needed only for the Arithmetical UDA, not for UDA itself).
So a short answer is that a universal number is just a computer. logicians have discovered the computer in arithmetic, well before the engineer build sort of physical approximation of them in "nature". How could a number acts like a computer? Well, I will not try to explains this here and now, but we will come back on this. Just keep in mind that a universal number is just a 'mathematical" computer, and a computation done by that computer will appear to be related to a sequence of number. If you assume computationalism, when you dream (or even are awake), your brain/computer (by assumption) does a computation, and some subjective experience (the 'dream') can be associated to that computation.
Then it is possible to define (and build) a universal dovetailer. This is a program which makes the computer generating all possible programs (virtual machines) and executing them all, by a dovetailing procedure (that I will explain probably in step 7). That is: one program generates all possible computations. That will give the many dreams.

UDA 1

You ask:
SL, why do you set apart quantum teleportation and digital teleportation? What's the difference? I wonder why the original has to be destroyed?
Well, again, this is not needed for UDA. Just keep in mind that in classical teleportation (like in UDA) you are scanned, destroyed, and reconstituted elsewhere, BUT: you don't have to be destroyed. In Quantum teleportaion, a completely different technic is used, based on the existence of the quantum superpositions, and it happens that with such technic we have to destroyed the infomartion. This we can explain and discuss later, it is more demanding on Quantum Mechanics.

You ask:
Here's a stupid question:

Let's say Jack is pasted a year later. During that time the solar system has moved a long distance through space. Does Jack's different place in the cosmos have any effect on the infinite numerical associations going on in Jack's brain?
As you notice, the answer should be "no", as the movement of the solar system can't change the content of the information that has been read during the scanning. Of course, fater the reconstitution, if Jack look at the star, he might slowly realize that some time has gone through. The point is that without such evidences, he cannot be aware of any delay. OK?

You ask:
Maybe I'm just a dummy, but there seems to be a 100 percent, 1st person chance that X- Jack will end up in W, and a 100 percent, 1st person chance that X- jack will end up in M.
You are right, but this is a third person description of the situation. After the duplication you are in W, *and* you are in M. But from the first person point of view of 'both of you', you feel like you are in only one city. In W, the you in W, feels being in W and has only intellectual knowledge that he has a doppelganger in M, and vice versa. The probabilities we are interested in are the one bearing on the future first person points of view. You know in advance, (because you assume comp) that whatever happens in that experience, you will feel to be in only one city, with some doppelganger in the other city. And you cannot predict which one in advance, as if you say "W", you know that the guy in M will refutes this, and vice versa. If you iterate that experience (with both of "you" coming back from W and M, and redoing the same experience), there will be four stories:

MM
MW
WW
WM,

described in each individual diaries. None of them could say "I am WM, and I predicted this in advance". All right? In fact, in this case, the probability to be the one with the "story" "WM" is 1/4 (if you accept the 50/50 for the single duplication) OK?
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Re: UDA for Dummies

Post by burningmouth » Tue Jan 29, 2013 12:04 am

UDA 4
salvialover24 wrote:I give you the protocol.

You will be in Amsterdam, again.

(Let me be clear: by "you" I mean the little ego, not (necessarily) your higher self, nor Gods nor Godesses, but the little you who relates his/her things of life in his/her personal diary. Like '---Gosh, my favorite mushroom is illegal in Amsterdam it is the end of the world", or "I should not forget to give a phone call to Claude tomorrow, ..."').

You will be read and annihilated, that is cut, and pasted again in W and in M.

OK? We have already done that.

But now, you are pasted in Moscow immediately, like in the preceding step. But in Washington, the reconstitution (pasting) will be delayed for one year, and this again in a place, like a room, with no clue that time went by.

The questions, asked to you in Amsterdam, when you are sober, is: 'what is the chance that you will find yourself in M? What is the chance that you will find yourself in W?'

What do you think?
After reading the replies in the official UDA 4 thread, I agree that there is a 50/50 probability.

UDA 5
salvialover24 wrote:The protocol is very simple. You are in London (for a change). You are scanned, at the correct substitution level (which exists by hypothesis), and again that information is sent somewhere; to Beijing to fix the idea, where, after some delay (say), "you" are reconstituted from the received scanned information.

The difference with the preceding setting is that "you" are not annihilated in the starting box, in London, thus. You are just copy and pasted (not: cut and pasted!).

The question is the same, and is asked to you, in London, just before the scanning is done: '---What is the probability that you will feel to be the one staying in London? What is the probability that you will feel to be the one reconstituted in Beijing?

What do you think?
The probabilities are still 50/50.
salvialover24 wrote:From this you can already understand that mechanism makes consciousness non local, and indeterminate a priori. If you do any experience, to predict with certainty the outcome of the experience available to you, i.e. from a first person perspective (which is always the case when you are the one doing the experience), you have to take into account the whole universe, or the whole reality, or the whole collection of realities, to be sure that you are not reconstituted, somewhere, in your present computational state, so as to stay in front of your experimental device. (Those who knows a bit quantum mechanics (which I do not assume) can perhaps already smell some similarity. Indeed QM implies some appearances of non-locality and indeterminacy in the observations).
Interesting, SL24.

UDA 6
salvialover24 wrote:Step 6 is, in some sense, a modern version of the oldest argument in metaphysics: the dream argument. Its purpose consists in singling out the basic weakness of any metaphysics based on the idea that what we see is what is real, for we can see many things in dream, and yet consider them as being an illusion, or as having a different status of what we want to take as real in the awake state (if that exists). Those who can remember strong realist dreams, can know that an internal (subjective) feeling of reality is not a proof of existence of an objective external reality, so that we can never be sure that we are awake, or that what we see is real, or is a faithful representation of what is real.
We can be sure of our consciousness existence, but we can doubt all content of consciousness (except the very fact that we are conscious).

Now the same argument can be made with video games. With the progress in technology, such views are more and more tangible and convincing.
We can imagine a sort of computer based video game, which would be so perfect, that we might not been aware that we are embedded in such a game.

With the digital mechanist assumption, we can go one step deeper, and copy (and cut) a brain replacing it by a digital device, and embed it in a computer with a sufficiently good virtual (computer generated) reality rendering software. The virtual environment should be enough precise that, again, you cannot subjectively discover any clues (like pixelation).

Now, for sure, if you have enough time for looking at the details of the environment, you might discover some clues (by looking some piece of "matter" with a microscope, for example, in case the programmer did not program such details). This lack of tiny details does not concern us, because, as usual, the questions asked will concern probabilities bearing on subjective immediate feelings.

The UDA step 6 protocols are the same as in the step 1-5. All questions which have been asked are all asked again. Step 6 is really five steps. The only difference is that, instead of being reconstituted in some real environment, you are reconstituted virtually in some computer, which runs some program emulating a virtual reconstitution of those real environments, with a correct interfacing with the program running you.

So, for example, here is the protocol and the question for the 5th step, in the "6 step manner":

You are in London, and you are copied, but not cut, and you are pasted, as a program, in a computer which simulates the Beijing city, with a sufficiently good rendering so that for an hour or two you can't see the difference with the "real Beijing".

The questions, asked to you before the copying process, are: '---What is the probability that you will feel finding yourself in London (resp. Beijing)?'

Let me already give you a collection of variants. What will happen if we slow down the computer (which 'contains or execute your program' in the virtual Beijing"? Will that change the probabilities (hint: step two). Will that change anything, from your personal perspective?
And again, 50/50.
salvialover24 wrote:
kedabra wrote:Its relatively clear to me how you could scan a human being, and make a digital physical copy.

I'm not so clear how this would work if the reconstitution was virtual. We would have to simulate the laws of physics acting on the copy in a simulated environment I guess...do we know how physics works accurately enough?
Do you remember one realist non lucid dream?
In dreams, the brain simulates enough of reality so as to make us believe that we are not dreaming, yet it does it without any deep knowledge of how physics works.
But, always assuming the mechanist hypothesis, (and the neuro-philosophy to ease the things), even when we are awake, the brain receives a finite amount of information, coming from the sensory peripheric nervous system, and sent it, through the cerebral stem little knot, to the brain. At the substitution level, this is digitalized, and is a finite amount of information, the kind of which the stem and the cortex generates in the dream.
So we don't need not much of the physics of the environment to simulate it "perfectly" for a short time.
You can replace the virtual Moscow, or the virtual Washington, or Beijing (whatever) by just a little room, with different numbers (0 and 1) painted on the wall, if you don't want to afford for the simulation of a whole city. Just transform the question accordingly (what is the probability that I will see 0 painted on the wall, ...).
salvialover24 wrote: Assuming mechanism, the brain provides "natural virtual reality". When we are awake, we are in a dream state somehow, but hopefully connected or mirroring sufficiently our most probable neighborhood.
The complexity of rendering correctly the feeling of being in a real city can be abstracted away by deciding to embed you in a video game. Yet it is interesting that we can make that embedding as precise as possible, by just giving the correct finite amount of input in the finite artificial digital stem of an artificial digital brain. We don't have such a technology, yet, but all what counts in the reasoning, is that it is possible in principle.


To sum up, the participants seem to agree that if we assume mechanism, we survive digital brain transplant, and from the first person point of view, we don't feel the length of the reconstitution delays, we don't necessarily distinguish real environment from virtual environment, and we are indeterminate in case of digital self-multiplication, or re-apparition of our computational states in some real or virtual environment, and this independently of the annihilation or not of the "original" experiencer, and of the delay of the reconstitutions. OK?

This you have to remind, and use, for answering the step 7 question.
salvialover24 wrote:A last question (before going to step 7). That question might seem a bit sophisticated, but it will help in step 7.

Imagine that you are here and now, in some computational state S. Well, that should not be difficult, given that you are, assuming mechanism, in some computational state S, here and now.
Now, in another galaxy, perhaps billions years in the future, or in the past, some computing machinery generate, through a computation about which I say nothing except that it has some similar stability that your own, that very computational state S, with a immediate (virtual, say) continuation which includes the vision of a flying pig.
I add that there is nowhere, in the whole physical reality (or even the whole reality, physical or not) a generation of that state S. Only one here and now, and the one in that far away galaxy (that is the protocol).
What is the probability, here and now, that you will see a flying pig?
<added colors: burningmouth>

Hmmm, when you state "only one here and now, doesn't that preclude the other state? If so, then shouldn't the 'here and now' state be 100 percent?
....But, if the 'here and now' state encompasses both states (even if separated by time and space), then I can see how it would still be a 50/50 probability. So I guess you're saying that two perfectly identical states of mind are both going to witness a flying pig, regardless of where they are in time and space. If I'm missing something, please explain.
salvialover24 wrote:In dreams, the brain simulates enough of reality so as to make us believe that we are not dreaming, yet it does it without any deep knowledge of how physics works.
Off Topic:
Something I (burningmouth the dummy) have noticed is that the ego identity I have while dreaming is an even bigger dummy than the normal dummy-me . :(

In other words, the dream ego is too f'ing stupid to question his surroundings. He's always doing stupid things. Today I dreamed that I was clocking in to work. I was supposed to be using one of those old fashioned stiff paper time cards that get stamped with the current time -- except instead of using a time card, I was (stupidly) attempting to use a random piece of paper, and I couldn't get it to stamp. My dream ego was too dumb to figure out what was going on. :roll:

It's as if our dream egos are purposely constructed so that they can't question the validity of the dream simulation.
"BOINGGG." Maybe our regular states of mind are ALSO constructed so that we don't question OUR surroundings/simulation.

Of course, during lucid dreaming I guess one can question such things.

##################

Another idea that crossed my mind:
If identical twins get a kind of 6th sense about what's going on with each other, shouldn't copy and pasted 'clones' have a 6th sense that there is more than one of them out and about in the multiverse?

##################

SL24, after UDA 1-6, what should I be figuring out by now? I can see that the 50/50 probability is a running theme. Is there a wider perspective that I should be grasping?

Thanks for your answers.

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Re: UDA for Dummies

Post by salvialover24 » Tue Jan 29, 2013 1:34 pm

It looks you are ready for step seven. I make short comment on some points.

You write:
Hmmm, when you state "only one here and now, doesn't that preclude the other state?
I use "here and now" to point on where you are, when single (I mean without yet a doppelganger!) before the duplication. That is just to insist that the probability is asked before the duplication is made. "here and now" contains your actual thought about where you might feel yourself to be after the duplication.
If so, then shouldn't the 'here and now' state be 100 percent?
You are right, but you are really saying that, here and now, the probability of being here and now is one. The probability asked , here and now, concerns where you might be "there and later". It is not null, as you have already agreed that if comp is true, a simple teleportation brings a non null probability, to be at the place where you are (uniquely or not reconstituted). OK?
....But, if the 'here and now' state encompasses both states (even if separated by time and space), then I can see how it would still be a 50/50 probability.
OK. "here and now" has just to be large enough for your brain to process the thought *about* later, and there (and where).
It encompasses both states, in the mind of the guy who think about those states.
So I guess you're saying that two perfectly identical states of mind are both going to witness a flying pig, regardless of where they are in time and space. If I'm missing something, please explain.
If you agree with the 50/50 as above, it seems to me that "here and now", you are in a state which will diverge into

1) "there and an instant later, in the other galaxy, I am in front of a flying pig"

and

2) "still here, and an instant later, in our usual galaxy, and planet, and NOT in front of a flying pig",

so that "in Gods eyes, you here and now will see a flying pig with P = 1/2, again. (I say "in God's eyes"as you, here, don't know the presence of your doppelganger in the other galaxy, so P=1/2, but you are not aware of that, only in the thought experience). OK?

It should not be different from the other case, but ask for any further clarification, and of course keep in mind we assume comp all along.

You wrote:
Off Topic:
Something I (burningmouth the dummy) have noticed is that the ego identity I have while dreaming is an even bigger dummy than the normal dummy-me . :(

In other words, the dream ego is too f'ing stupid to question his surroundings. He's always doing stupid things. Today I dreamed that I was clocking in to work. I was supposed to be using one of those old fashioned stiff paper time cards that get stamped with the current time -- except instead of using a time card, I was (stupidly) attempting to use a random piece of paper, and I couldn't get it to stamp. My dream ego was too dumb to figure out what was going on. :roll:
Lol. yes, we can climb some high state of dummyness in dreams. It is a good way to train yourself in the exploration of dummyland.
Descartes seemed to have remember dreams in which he was able to believe quasi obvious contradiction like a triangle with four sides !
Swim believes that salvia is not bad to trick us in similar directions, and as you know, salvianauts can look quite retards.
No problem, in front of the big unknown we are all retards.
It's as if our dream egos are purposely constructed so that they can't question the validity of the dream simulation.
"BOINGGG." Maybe our regular states of mind are ALSO constructed so that we don't question OUR surroundings/simulation.
I think so. But we have to hope the environment helps in the task, so that we can share those environments. To be awake is to be dreaming with a dream which match (hopefully) some reality we share or try to share with other dreamers, if you want. This will make more precise at the next step.
Of course, during lucid dreaming I guess one can question such things.
Or dream that one question such things :)
Another idea that crossed my mind:
If identical twins get a kind of 6th sense about what's going on with each other, shouldn't copy and pasted 'clones' have a 6th sense that there is more than one of them out and about in the multiverse?
Yes. if comp remains true in that situation, it means that the substitution level must be taken low enough so that the "6th sense" is preserved.
SL24, after UDA 1-6, what should I be figuring out by now? I can see that the 50/50 probability is a running theme. Is there a wider perspective that I should be grasping?
You have already figure out that with comp, a priori a deterministic theory, we get indeterminacy, non locality (your proba on next experience can depend on what happens in a far away galaxy), etc. That is already a lot, and actually more than some academics. The next step (seven) should help you to see the reversal between physics and computer science, and eventually why Plato got 1 and Aristotle 0 in the mechanist soccer game :)

I think there is a UDA 7 thread, have you try to read it. Do you want *me* asking the question. Have you an idea how the universal dovetailer works, and what it is? If you want, we can proceed by only simple exercises, like "can you put the two expression "salvialover24" and "burningmouth" in alphabetical order?
The wider perspective will come in time.

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Re: UDA for Dummies

Post by burningmouth » Wed Jan 30, 2013 7:00 am

salvialover24 wrote:I think there is a UDA 7 thread, have you try to read it. Do you want *me* asking the question. Have you an idea how the universal dovetailer works, and what it is? If you want, we can proceed by only simple exercises, like "can you put the two expression "salvialover24" and "burningmouth" in alphabetical order?
The wider perspective will come in time.
Can you put the two expression "salvialover24" and "burningmouth" in alphabetical order?
What? Am I an idiot? Of course I can put those two expresions in alphabetical order. :roll:
a. salvialover24
b. burningmouth

Uh, wait.
Do you want *me* asking the question. Have you an idea how the universal dovetailer works, and what it is?
I constantly need a refresher course. But you can keep the explanations short and sweet.

##################

OK. I have my own thought experiment.
Let's say that at 12AM midnight my consciously aware self is copy and pasted 999 times into 999 different computer simulations. Each of those computer simulations involve my consciously aware self -- copy and pasted in bed with a beautiful and "willing" woman.

Also, at the very same time of 12AM midnight, my consciously aware self walks in front of a speeding bus and is hit and knocked fifty feet into a ditch.

Salvialover24 runs up to my bleeding body and exclaims," Burning, don't be in so much distress. There is only a .001 percent chance that you just got hit by a bus!

Well, shit. A lot of good that reasoning is going to do with me laying there in pain. The (first person POV) me that's laying there feels like he's 100 percent in pain -- not .001 percent in pain.

##edit##
I think I might have found part of the answer...
salvialover24 wrote:Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism).
#################

OK. I'm about to start re-reading the UDA 7 thread.
Last edited by burningmouth on Wed Jan 30, 2013 10:57 am, edited 9 times in total.

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Re: UDA for Dummies

Post by burningmouth » Wed Jan 30, 2013 7:46 am

UDA 7
salvialover24 wrote:
Here is the protocol.

1) you are here and now (that's easy, you are just respecting that aspect of the protocol right now, wherever you are).

2) you are told (and you trust that telling) that:

a) the physical universe is expanding for ever
b) that some alien civilisation has implemented a Universal Dovetailer, and let it run forever. They have to manage in some way its ever growing memory, and that is why we need an ever expanding, and sufficiently robust universe.

A Universal Dovetailer (UD) is a program which generates all programs, and executes all programs. Given that there is an infinity of programs, and that many of them will never stop, the UD is obliged to run them little pieces by little pieces. Obviously, such a UD running never stops itself. You can also guess that it generates a sort of fractal, given that it will generate its own running infinitely often. You can guess it generates a highly redundant computations. The Mandelbrot set lover can compare the UD with it.

Concerning the existence of such a program, you can take my word for it. That's OK, if only to see the consequences for the fun.
If you don't want to take my word for it, you can read the explanation that I have already provided to Kedabra on this, in his simulated reality thread. Such a program exists indeed. That is a consequence of something known as Church thesis (or Post thesis, Turing thesis: it has been discovered by many people). I have actually programmed a UD, and let it run for six days in 1991(*) :lol: (it *is* laughable, because such a program has no purpose, really).

OK, for the protocol? Unlike my 1991 concrete UD, in this protocol, you are told that it will run forever.

Now here is the question. After awhile, you are a bit tired to be here and now, and you decide to do something, like drinking some tea (say). So you put some water on the gas. The question is: how can you compute exactly, in principle, the probability that you will see if the water boil?

I don't mind the computation being rather difficult to perform. I only ask how to compute in principle the exact probability that the water will boil, from your perspective, given that protocol.

The key is of course in the last paragraph of my last post to the UDA step 6 post, and being in good mood 8-), I cut and past it below:
To sum up, the participants seem to agree that if we assume mechanism, we survive digital brain transplant, and from the first person point of view, we don't feel the length of the reconstitution delays, we don't necessarily distinguish real environment from virtual environment, and we are indeterminate in case of digital self-multiplication, or re-apparition of our computational states in some real or virtual environment, and this independently of the annihilation or not of the "original" experiencer, and of the delay of the reconstitutions. OK?
Step 7 is just like step 6, except that the universe run a non stopping generator of all programs, and that it run (execute) all those programs, by using the dovetailing technic to avoid the non stopping trap, as we can't due to the diagonalization. Such a program will generate infinitely often your current state, so that by UDA 1-6, you are , here and now, indeterminate on which computations you will soon experience, and your immediate future is entirely determined by the statistics on those computations, so the physical laws have to be recovered by such a statistics.

##############################
a) the physical universe is expanding for ever
b) that some alien civilisation has implemented a Universal Dovetailer, and let it run forever. They have to manage in some way its ever growing memory, and that is why we need an ever expanding, and sufficiently robust universe.
SL, a and b above blew my mind. Is this possibly why the universe is expanding? So that more computing memory for the 'Grand Simulation' is produced? I love this idea. Have others discussed this idea in the scientific literature?

Kedabra (in the UDA7 thread) brought up entropy. Can entropy fit into the UD or simulation idea?

Also, in your 'The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations' paper, you used the 'dropping of a pen' for your thought experiment. I like the idea of a dropping pen as a starting point. Maybe you could use the dropping pen for any future examples. I want to visualize the whole damn UD argument from the perspective of a dropping pen. Hell, I started this thread, so I'm giving myself some power -- and why not? I just got hit by a f'ing bus!
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/public ... ARCHAL.htm

###################

OK. I just re-read the UDA7 thread. It was only two pages long, but it was already beyond my ability to understand it.

So this is how I would like us to continue. From now on, I would like you to describe the UD using the example of a pen dropping. I think it's a great visual. It involves a first person POV. It contains movement which implies an infinity of running numerical associations. I guess it's possible for the pen to turn into a flying pig before it hits the floor. Also, I want to try to embed my actual salvia experiences into the discussion. But before we delve into the dropping pen visual, maybe you can answer the questions I posed. Take your time. You don't have to answer them all at once.
Thanks...........

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Re: UDA for Dummies

Post by salvialover24 » Wed Jan 30, 2013 10:35 am

burningmouth wrote:
Can you put the two expression "salvialover24" and "burningmouth" in alphabetical order?
What? Am I an idiot? Of course I can put those two expresions in alphabetical order. :roll:
a. salvialover24
b. burningmouth

Uh, wait.
Hmm... That's not completely correct. But I can wait :)

I constantly need a refresher course. But you can keep the explanations short and sweet.
Hmm... making explanations short might ask for more work, but not problem, I can try. Making it sweet might be more difficult, and can depend on your taste. Thanks to your post I do have some ideas ...
OK. I have my own thought experiment.
Let's say that at 12AM midnight my consciously aware self is copy and pasted 999 times into 999 different computer simulations. Each of those computer simulations involve my consciously aware self -- copy and pasted in bed with a beautiful and "willing" woman.

Also, at the very same time of 12AM midnight, my consciously aware self walks in front of a speeding bus and is hit and knocked fifty feet into a ditch.
OK, just to relate with the protocol in the preceding step, I supposed that you have really been copied 1000 times. 999 copies has reconstituted in some computer, together with some sweet and "willing" woman, and one is reconstituted in ("real life" or computer-virtual: we already know by step six that this does not change the expectation or the probabilities)) in front of a speeding bus, soon being hit and knocked into ditch. OK.
Salvialover24 runs up to my bleeding body and exclaims," Burning, don't be in so much distress. There is only a .001 percent chance you just got hit by a bus!
I would say that. I might say this just a midnight, just before you get reconstituted, as *at that period of time* there is only .001 chance that you will feel living being hurt by a bus, and 999/1000 (almost 1) chance that you will be with a nice sweet and willing woman.
BUT: once the copy are constituted, there is no more chance at all. The poor burning in front of the bus has 1/1 chance to be hit, like each copy with a sweet woman has 1/1 chance to be with that sweet woman. The probability exists only before the experience is done. That's the same with the lottery: before you have 1/10^9 chance (say) to win, but after, it is either 1/1 chance that you have won, or 1/1 chance that you have not won. OK?
So, sl24 will do his best to help that rarer but definite poor burning hit by the bus, as he is in 1/1 chance in a difficult situation.
Well, shit. A lot of good that reasoning is going to do with me laying there in pain. The (first person POV) me that's laying there feels like he's 100 percent in pain -- not .001 percent in pain.
You are right. We might have a relief that the probability that shit happens tomorrow is low, but in case shit did happen, this is no more consolation at all. The probabilities bears on expectation of the result of an experience not yet done, only that we will do. And, once the experience is done, the probabilities vanish to give quite certain events. I hope you don't find me to much prosaic here ...
##edit##
I think I might have found part of the answer...
salvialover24 wrote:Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism).
Not really. This will concern us with ... step 8, which I have promised to kedabra since some time, but it is subtler, and it is better to be sure that people grasp entirely the seven first steps. In step 8: the physical reality disappear, somehow, or become a secondary thing, and some people don't like that at all ... Also I am thinking about anew version of the step 8 ...

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Re: UDA for Dummies

Post by burningmouth » Wed Jan 30, 2013 11:13 am

Hey SL. I don't want to become the questioner from hell, but I have another question. :mrgreen:

Let's say I'm watching a pen drop. Can you explain 'comp indeterminacy' using the visual of a pen dropping? Also, can you explain the term 'substitution level' using the visual of a pen dropping? This is the only way I'm going to be able to understand this stuff. I want to build a UD world that radiates from the visual of a pen dropping. I know you're busy and I don't want to bug you. To give you an idea just how UN-busy I am, I'm sitting in my Lazy Boy chair in my pajamas. No, I don't mean my chair is wearing my pajamas -- I'm wearing pajamas.
What I'm saying is: I don't have a job. This thread is my job. I WANT TO EXPERIENCE A 'AHA' MOMENT, DAMMIT! (I haven't smoked salvia in a month -- maybe I should.)

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